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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of credit, liquidity and operational risks in
six Indonesian’s islamic banking financing products namely mudharabah, musyarakah, murabahah, istishna,
ijarah and qardh, in order to try to discover whether or not Indonesian islamic banking is based on the
“risk-sharing” system. This paper relies on a fixed effect model test based on the panel data analysis
method, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2013. The research is an exploratory and descriptive study
of all the Indonesian islamic banks that were operating in 2013. The results of this study show that the
Islamic banking system in Indonesia truly has banking products based on “risk-sharing.” We found out
that credit, operational and liquidity risks as a whole, have significant influence on mudarabah, musyarakah,
murabahah, istishna, ijarah and qardh based financing. There is a correlation between the credit risk and
mudarabah based financing, and no causal relationship between the credit risk and musharaka, murabahah,
ijarah, istishna and qardh based financing. There is also correlation between the operational risk and mudarabah
and murabahah based financing, and no causal relationship between the operational risk and musharaka,
istishna, ijarah and qardh based financing. There is correlation between the liquidity risk and istishna based
financing, and no causal relationship between the liquidity risk and musharaka, mudarabah, murabahah, ijarah
and qardh based financing. A major implication of  this study is the fact that there is no causal relationship
between the credit risk and musharakah based financing, which is the mode of financing where the islamic
bank shares the risk with its clients, but there is an influence of credit risk toward mudarabah mode
financing, a financing mode where the Islamic bank bears all the risk. These findings can lead us to
conclude that the Indonesian Islamic banking sector is based on the “risk sharing” system.
Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh risiko kredit, likuiditas dan operasional
pada enam produk pembiayaan perbankan syariah di Indonesia yaitu mudharabah, musyarakah, murabahah,
istishna, ijarah dan qardh, dalam rangka untuk mencoba menjawab pertanyaan apakah atau tidak, perbankan
syariah di Indonesia berbasis “risk sharing” sistem. Penelitian ini mengunakan model efek tetap berdasarkan
metode analisis data panel, dengan fokus pada periode dari tahun 2007 sampai 2013. Demikian, penelitian
ini merupakan penelitian bersifat eksploratif dan deskriptif pada keseluruhan bank syariah Indonesia yang
beroperasi saat ini di tahun 2013. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa, sistem perbankan syariah di
Indonesia dapat dinyatakan memiliki produk perbankan berbasis “pembagian risiko.” Kami menemukan
bahwa risiko kredit, operasional dan likuiditas secara keseluruhan, memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan
terhadap pembiayaan mudarabah, musyarakah, murabahah, istishna, ijarah dan qardh. Ada korelasi antara risiko
kredit dan pembiayaan mudarabah, dan tidak ada korelasi antara kredit risiko dan pembiayaan musyarakah,
Diallo et al.
280
Introduction
Islamic banking and finance is develop-
ing at a remarkable pace even in some non-
Muslim countries. This banking and finance
concept is based on the Qur’an and the Suna,
the Muslim’s holy books. For most of  the
people the prohibition of interest or riba, is
the well-known part of  islamic financing. For
islamic scholars, islamic banking and finance
are also known as a profit and loss sharing
and risk sharing method of  financing. Deposi-
tors/savers do not bear any risk in conven-
tional financing; however islamic finance has
another solution which is called PLS (profit-
loss sharing). Risks and profits between the
parties involved in any financial transaction
are shared by both the financial institutions
and depositors/savers in a predefined ratio.
Among all the religions, Islam is the one
that claims to have economic laws, as well as
a financial system. An islamic financial sys-
tem is one that complies with islamic religious
law (the shariah). Islamic finance has become
an important part of the international finan-
cial system and was, certainly, one of  its fast-
est growing components over the last few
decades. In the wake of  the financial crisis,
there has been a renewed debate on the role
that Islamic financing can play in the stabili-
zation of the global financial system, one re-
lated to the strong ethical principles on which
this type of financing is based. Nowadays,
islamic financing is practiced in USA as well
as in Europe and Asia, and in Africa there is
also some islamic banks that have developed
since the 1990s; islamic finance has devel-
oped significantly over the years to become a
noticeable part of the international financial
system. The value of islamic financial assets
worldwide increased from USD 150 billion
in the mid-1990s to an estimated USD 1.6
trillion by the end of 2012. Islamic banking
continues to dominate the global islamic fi-
nance industry, covering approximately 80
percent of  total islamic financial assets. Five
prominent Gulf States (Iran, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and
Qatar), as well as countries in South-East
Asia (most notably Malaysia) account for most
of the Islamic banking market.
While islamic financial instruments
share some of the same merits as conven-
tional ones, they have certain distinct features
Keywords: ijarah; islamic banking and finance; istishna; mudarabah; musharakah; murabahah;
Qardh; risk sharing
 JEL classification: M49,P40, Z12
murabahah, ijarah, istishna dan qardh. Ada pun korelasi antara risiko operasional dan pembiayaan mudarabah
dan murabahah, dan tidak ada korelasi antara risiko operasional dan pembiayaan musyarakah, istishna, ijarah
dan qardh. Ada korelasi antara risiko likuiditas dan pembiayaan istishna, dan tidak ada korelasi antara risiko
likuiditas dan pembiayaan musyarakah, mudarabah, murabahah, ijarah dan qardh. Implikasi utama dari penelitian
ini adalah kenyataan bahwa tidak ada hubungan risiko kredit dan pembiayaan berdasarkan musharakah,
yang merupakan modus pembiayaan dimana bank syariah berbagi risiko dengan klien, tetapi ada pengaruh
risiko kredit dengan pembiayaan mudharabah, modus pembiayaan dimana bank syariah menanggung semua
risiko. Temuan ini dapat mengakibabkan kesimpulan bahwa sektor perbankan syariah di Indonesia
berdasarkan pada “risk sharing” sistem.
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that differentiate them from their counterparts.
Highlighting the issue of risk, the risks asso-
ciated with islamic finance and those faced
in the conventional financial system are
slightly different.
Literature Review
In any economic model, although per-
fect risk sharing is not supported by data, it
remains important to quantify the operative
channels through which (partial) risk sharing
takes place. In particular, there is a need to
first identify the specific channels through
which risk is shared and then quantify the
extent of the risk shared through each chan-
nel. In economics, this had not been possible
until the mold-breaking work of  Asdrubali
et al. (1996) that proposed a method to quan-
tify the relative contributions of risk sharing
channels in the US. Extending the framework
of  Asdrubali et al. (1996) in a cross-country
context,  Sorensen and Yosha (1998) empiri-
cally explored the risk sharing patterns among
the European Union (EU) and OECD coun-
tries. Their method built on decomposing the
cross-sectional variance of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) into various components, rep-
resenting the incremental amount of smooth-
ing achieved through factor income flows,
capital depreciation, international transfers
and savings. This decomposition approach
was simply based on standard national ac-
count identities: Gross National Income
(GNI)= Gross Domestic Product (GDP) +
net factor income, National Income (NI)=
Gross National Income (GNI) - capital de-
preciation, Disposable National Income
(DNI)= National Income (NI) + interna-
tional transfers, and, Consumption (C)= Dis-
posable National Income (DNI) - savings.
In islamic finance, the risk sharing per-
centage in relation to the capital participa-
tion is expressed through the Islamic term “al-
ghorm bil ghonm” which means “No reward
without risk.” Specific channels through
which risk is shared have already been iden-
tified, now the research can be concentrated
on determining the risk level shared through
each channel.
Islamic Banking Concept
The primary sources of the Islamic reli-
gious law, the shariah are the Qur’an and the
Sunna, the sayings and actions of the Prophet
Muhammad transmitted orally in the form of
the Hadeeth (the stories of  the Prophet’s com-
panions). The Qur’an and the Sunna leave
room for interpretation: They do not cover
all of the questions confronting the contem-
porary Muslim community1 accordingly there
is a need to resort to secondary sources of
law.
These secondary sources are Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh), based on the interpreta-
tions (ijtihad) of experts in particular cases,
on deductive reasoning (qiyas)2 and on the
expert consensus of various schools of
thought (ijma).3 However, there is controversy
1 The revealed legal evidence is divided into two categories: qat’iyyat (unambiguous evidence) and zanniyyat
(probabilistic evidence), whereby the former is not permitted to be interpreted and the latter leaves some scope for
interpretation by qualified Muslim jurists.
2 This means that if a ruling is required on a case not covered by the Quran and the Sunna, a comparison can be
made with a similar  situation covered by these.
3 The underlying idea is that the ummah (Muslim community) itself  becomes a source of  law. However, there is
no agreement on the  consensus; the scope of which varies from the entire community of believers to the agreements
of scholars.
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as to whether interpretation is still possible,
as some scholars maintain that all interpreta-
tion was completed centuries ago. This is fur-
ther complicated by the divide between the
Sunni and the Shia branches of Islam, and
the presence of several schools of thought
on Islamic jurisprudence within each of  these
denominations. Orthodox Sunni Islam, for
example, has four main schools of  law.4
Differences in the interpretation of the
law (fiqh) can have significant implications
for the development of islamic finance. The
lack of  harmonization of  islamic rules, with
different scholars expressing different views,
could give rise to uncertainty on one critical
issue, namely whether certain financial instru-
ments are compliant with the shariah.
Every aspect of  Muslim’s daily life is
regulating by these 4 sources. The Qur’an
contains explicit rules regulating personal sta-
tus, contracts, property, civil and criminal law,
and the economic system. The main prescrip-
tions relating to financial transactions are:
The prohibition of riba’ 5 (i.e. the payment
of  a fixed or determinable interest on funds);
and the prohibition of economic practices
that involve the concept of gharar (deceptive
uncertainty), maysir (speculation) and harâm
(prohibited behavior).
Key Prohibitions
The Prohibition of Riba
In the Qur’an, there are several verses
that condemn riba,’ which literally means “In-
crease, addition and surplus.” These originate
from a pre-islamic practice whereby the
amount due was doubled if the debtor proved
unable to repay the debt at maturity.5
The Prohibition of Gharar and Maysir
All activities that contain elements of
uncertainty, such as commercial transactions
in which there is uncertainty about an asset
or its price, are covered by the prohibition of
gharar (uncertainty) and maysir (gambling)
stipulated in the Qur’an .
Because an element of uncertainty can
be found in almost all commercial transac-
tions, it is excessive gharar that is prohibited.
For example, excessive gharar can be identi-
fied in the case of  insurance contracts. Fu-
tures, forwards and other derivatives also fall
under gharar, as there is no certainty that the
object of the sale will exist at the time the
trade has to be executed.
These instruments are also subject to
the prohibition on maysir, which condemns
the speculative exploitation of legal uncer-
tainty in order to draw an unjustified (because
it is unfair) advantage. In addition, specula-
tion (maysir) is seen as diverting resources
from productive activities.
Gharar and maysir render a contract null
and void. However, there can be some ex-
ceptions to this general principle. Given the
important role of derivatives in the manage-
ment and allocation of risk and in financial
innovation, some islamic economists are
making an effort to structure shariah-compli-
ant financial contracts that are similar to de-
rivatives. They argue that some islamic con-
tracts (e.g. salam and istishna’ contracts) have
certain features in common with derivatives
(e.g. futures or forward contracts).
For insurance products, islamic jurists
have developed a shariah-compliant system
based on mutual cooperation and assistance
4 These are the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali schools of law. For Shi’ites, the Jafari school of  law is the largest
one.
5 In particular, the prohibition is based on different verses in which riba’ is contrasted with alms to the poor.
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(commonly known as takaful). They aim to
create a structure very similar to that of  con-
ventional mutual insurance.15 Participants in
the takaful pay a sum of  money (tabarru’) to a
mutual cooperative fund, which is then used
for compensation should this be necessary.
The takaful company acts as the manager of
the fund; there is an agency contract and re-
muneration is seen as a share in any surplus –
this being the difference between the takaful
fund and any payments made. Funds are usu-
ally invested on the basis of shariah-compli-
ant contracts, particularly those featuring
mudarabah.
The Prohibition of Haram
Prohibitions under the Qur’an also in-
clude haram (forbidden) activities, which are
primarily related to tobacco, pornography,
arms, alcohol, pork and gambling.
The Profit and Loss Sharing Concept
The underlying theory of risk sharing
suggests that under complete financial mar-
kets, the consumption of individuals with
identical preferences should not respond to
idiosyncratic output shocks but should
strongly commove with aggregate consump-
tion (Diamond 1967; Wilson 1968; Cochrane
1991; and Mace 1991). By the same analogy,
the standard open macroeconomic models
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996; Lewis 1996)
showed that in the presence of the trade in
goods and financial assets, a country’s con-
sumption should be less correlated with do-
mestic output, but highly correlated with
world consumption. These models predict
that in a perfect risk sharing scenario (the
complete markets model), a country should
be able to completely detach consumption
from domestic output fluctuations. To vali-
date these theoretical predictions, there is
abundant empirical literature that has exam-
ined the perfect risk sharing conjecture (e.g.,
Obstfeld 1994; Stockman and Tesar 1995;
Baxter and Crucini 1995; Lewis 1996). The
consensus from this vast amount of litera-
ture indicates that there is only a weak pres-
ence of risk sharing among countries, which
is far from perfect and not consistent with
the predictions of standard theory (Kose et
al. 2007; Islamaj 2012). The leading expla-
nations offered for this low level of risk shar-
ing include the presence of non-traded goods,
incomplete financial markets and high trans-
actions costs.
In the Qur’an, many verses explicitly
condemn interest and interest-based transac-
tions. Likewise, many sayings of  the Prophet
severely condemn interest-based dealings. For
instance, Verse 2:275 states that “They say
that indeed al-bay’ [trade] is like al-riba [in-
terest-based debt contract]. But Allah has
permitted al-bay’ and has forbidden al-riba.”
This verse may be considered the cornerstone
of  the Qur’an’s conception of  an economy,
since from this verse flows major implications
of how an economy should be organized. Is-
lamic finance precludes any form of  inter-
est-based debt. A creditor cannot make in-
terest-based loans. A creditor has to invest
his money directly and bear the risk of his
enterprise. He is the direct owner of the as-
sets of his enterprise. A borrower cannot gen-
erate wealth on the basis of  borrowed money.
He cannot contract interest-based debt and
use it either for consumption or investment.
In islamic finance, the borrower-creditor con-
flict is absent. Entrepreneurs individually or
jointly participate directly in an enterprise
with their material and human wealth and
share the risk of  their enterprise. We define
this form of  organization as risk taking and
risk sharing (Askari et al. 2012). In a loan
contract, the creditor assumes no enterprise
risk; the latter is borne by the borrower. If
Diallo et al.
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the investment fails, the borrower is still le-
gally bound to reimburse the loan. In fact, in
the Qur’an the repayment of debt is an over-
riding obligation. No wealth can be inherited
prior to the discharge of every debt.
If we examine some of the major crises
in the international financial system like the
one in East Asia, the instability in the for-
eign exchange markets, the collapse of the
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)
hedge fund, and the prevailing crisis in the
U.S. financial system, we find that the easy
availability of credit and the resultant steep
rise in debt, particularly short-term debt, are
the results of inadequate market discipline
in the financial markets due to the absence
of  risk sharing. (Chapra 2007: 166-173).
Advocates of islamic banking thus ar-
gue that islamic banks are theoretically bet-
ter poised than conventional banks to absorb
external shocks because the banks’ financing
losses are partially absorbed by the deposi-
tors (Khan and Bhatti 2008; and Iqbal 1998).
Similarly, the risk sharing feature of  the PLS
paradigm, in theory, allows Islamic banks to
lend on a longer-term basis to projects with
higher risk-return profits and, thus, to pro-
mote economic growth (Chapra 1992; and
Mills and Presley 1999).
In investment, risk-sharing means that
investors are seeking profits with the expec-
tation that losses can happen. Based on the
legal maxim “profit is accompanied with risk”
(al-ghorm bil ghonm), risk-sharing in the trad-
ing environment is also known as risk-taking
(Steffensen 2013).
Under risk sharing, the borrower and
lender should share the risk. In banking, the
borrower unjustly bears all the risk associated
with the investment and vouchsafes the lender
a fixed interest income. Shifting the risk to
third parties benefits the individual firms but
has catastrophic consequences on the entire
financial market, just as savings may have
negative macroeconomic upshots (as opposed
to spending) on output and employment, but
ironically, the same savings are beneficial to
the individual. However, when the income-
earning asset is the subject matter of the sale
contract at a fixed price, there is room for
Islamic banks to shift the risk to the client.
This risk shifting, as a component of the
overall risk management strategy in Islamic
finance, is a win-win strategy as opposed to
a win-lose strategy in banking (Seif  2009).
History of  Islamic Banks in Indonesia
Islamic finance in Indonesia, the world’s
largest Muslim country, has evolved since
around 1990, mainly in response to the po-
litical demands from Muslim scholars and
organizations. The history of  islamic banks
in Indonesia can be traced back to that year
of 1990, when the conference of the Majelis
Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Jurist Council)
was held in Cisarua, West Java, Indonesia.
The first islamic cooperatives were estab-
lished in 1990, followed by rural banks in
1991 and the first islamic commercial bank
in 1992. In 1998, Bank Indonesia gave offi-
cial recognition, as part of a new banking act,
to the existence of a dual banking system,
conventional and islamic, or sharia based.
This led to the establishment of a second Is-
lamic Commercial Bank (ICB) and, until De-
cember 2003, of eight Islamic Commercial
Banking Units (ICBU) (out of a total of 138
commercial banks, comprising a total of 299
banking offices), with a continuing upward
trend, reaching 3 ICBs and 22 ICBUs, as of
December 2006, to actually reach 11 ICBs in
2013 as shown in the Table 1.
The market leaders in islamic finance
in Indonesia are the commercial banks. Dur-
ing the reporting period, 1991-­2013, they
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focused on medium and large-scale finance.
We are now observing the beginnings of  a
slow expansion into microfinance. Since Bank
Indonesia gave official recognition in 1998
to a dual banking system, conventional and
islamic, interest in islamic meso- and macro-
finance has spread among the commercial
banks, inspired by religious concerns and fu-
elled by low rates of  non-performing loans.
A clearer regulatory acknowledgment of
the existence of the Islamic banks in the In-
donesian banking system was first mentioned
in the Banking Act No. 10/1998 as an amend-
ment to the Banking Act No. 7/1992. In the
new banking act, it was stated that commer-
cial banks in Indonesia could operate in the
conventional way (based on the interest rate
system) or based on shariah principles. It is
also important to note that the new regula-
tion allowed a conventional bank to open a
shariah branch office with the aim of boost-
ing the development of  the industry. Further-
more, after the establishment of the new
Central Bank Act No. 23/1999, the impor-
tance of the islamic banking industry was
strengthened. Under this regulation, Bank
Indonesia as the central bank was mandated
to regulate, supervise and develop the islamic
banks.
Another important milestone in the de-
velopment of the islamic banking industry in
Indonesia took place in 2002 when Bank In-
donesia launched the “Blueprint of Islamic
Banking Development in Indonesia.” The
blueprint contained the vision, mission, and
strategic objectives to be achieved by islamic
banks in the country. Among others, the Is-
lamic banking industry in Indonesia was tar-
geted to capture 5 percent of the total mar-
ket share of the banking industry by year
2009. Further, just recently, the government
issued the Islamic Banking Act No.21/2008
that provided a legal basis for further devel-
opment of the industry in Indonesia.
The Main Financial Instruments
The Islamic finance industry has devel-
oped a wide range of shariah-compliant finan-
cial products. To ensure that they meet this
specification, they make use of contracts ac-
ceptable under traditional Islamic legal doc-
trine and also adapt conventional financial
contracts so that they comply with the tenets
of the shariah. They are mainly financial in-
struments that emphasize risk sharing and
promote entrepreneurship. These instruments
are categorized into 3 main groups, gratuitous
contracts such as heba, waqf and qardh, trad-
  Islamic Banking Network 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Islamic Commercial Bank 
Number of Banks 3 5 6 11 11 11 11 
Number of Offices 401 581 711 1215 1401 1745 1870 
Islamic Rural Bank 
Number of Banks 114 131 138 150 155 158 159 
Number of Offices 185 202 225 286 364 401 399 
 
Table 1. Islamic Banking Network Islamic Banking Network
Source: Islamic Banks Report, Indonesia Bank 2013 Report
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ing contracts such are ijarah, murabahah, salam,
istishna and so on, and investment contracts
such as mudarabah and musharakah. This pa-
per will analyze the risk influence towards 6
financial instruments, mudarabah, musharakah,
murabahah, istishna, ijarah and qardh.
 Mudarabah is defined as a contract between
a capital provider and an entrepreneur or a
fund manager, whereby the entrepreneur
or fund manager can mobilize the funds of
the former for its business activities within
the shariah guidelines. Profits made are
shared between the parties according to a
mutually agreed ratio.
 Musharakah is a contract between two par-
ties whereby both parties provide capital
and both may be active in managing the
venture. Losses are shared on the basis of
how much capital has been contributed.
Profits are shared in any way the partners
decide.
 Murabahah is the sale of goods at a price,
which includes a profit margin agreed to
by both parties. The purchase and selling
price, other costs, and the profit margin
must be clearly stated by the seller at the
time of the sale agreement.
 Salam contracts are contracts in which the
seller undertakes to supply some specific
goods to the buyer at a future date at a
mutually agreed price fully paid at the time
of the contract.
 Istisna contracts are contracts in which the
seller undertakes to supply some specific
goods to the buyer at a future date at a
mutually agreed price and method of pay-
ment.
 Ijarah contracts are the selling of benefits
or the use of  something, or a service, for a
fixed price or wage.
 Qardh contracts are loans in which the
debtor is only required to repay the amount
borrowed.
Islamic Banks Risk Management
Regulations
Based on the PBI (Bank of Indonesia
Regulation) 11/25/PBI/2009 dated July the
1st, 2009, set by Bank Indonesia; Islamic
banks should, as a minimum, apply risk man-
agement on four types of risk, namely (a)
credit risk; (b) market risk; (c) liquidity risk;
(d) Operational Risk.
In addition to the above risks, Islamic
banking is expected to overcome other risks,
namely: rate of return risk, equity investment
risk, shariah noncompliance risk, displaced
commercial risk, and inventory risk.
Preview Research
Idries (2011) has defined that the liquid-
ity risk is the possible loss resulting from the
bank’s incapability to either meet its respon-
sibilities or to fund increases in assets as they
fall due without incurring undesirable costs
or losses. Bauer and Ryser (2004) showed
banks’ hedging decisions against any risk de-
pend on the initial debt ratio, the size of  the
liquidation costs, regulatory restrictions, the
volatility of the risky assets and the spread
between the riskless interest rate and the de-
posit rate. Siddiqui (2008) found that Islamic
banks in Pakistan performed better in terms
of assets and returns by being forced to im-
prove their risk management by keeping their
liquidity within safe limits.
The next study by Ahmed et al. (2011)
investigated the liquidity risk management in
islamic banks in Pakistan and his findings
were positive but insignificant to the relation-
ship of the size of the bank and its network-
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ing capital to net assets with the liquidity risk
in Islamic banks. In addition, the return on
assets in islamic banks was found to have a
positive correlation to the liquidity risk man-
agement. While the next study, also by Shahid
and Abbas (2012) analyzed liquidity and
credit risks and the findings suggested prof-
itability and liquidity management in conven-
tional banking had performed better than Is-
lamic banking. However, for credit risk man-
agement and solvency maintenance, the per-
formance of the Islamic banks was better than
that of  the conventional banking sector.
According to McNeil and Embrechts
(2005) credit risk was the change in a portfo-
lio due to the unpredicted shifts in the credit
quality of  the issuer or trading partner. Ac-
cording to Ar unkumar and Kotreshwar
(2005) credit risk caused 70 percent of the
total risks that banks faced, while the other
30 percent was shared by the markets and
operational risks. In addition, Khan (2003)
stated that credit risk was a source of insta-
bility in the banking system. Abedifaret al.
(2013) had investigated the risks and stabil-
ity in islamic banking over the period from
1999 to 2009. This study’s findings showed
that in terms of  the insolvency risk, small
islamic banks appeared to be more stable, and
the loan quality of islamic banks was less re-
sponsive to domestic interest rates when com-
pared to conventional banks. While the op-
erational risk is the type of risk that can cause
direct or indirect losses, they are normally
caused by insufficient or unsuccessful inter-
nal practices, people, technology or from ex-
ternal events (BCBS 2001: 2). Al-Tamimi and
Al-Mazrooei (2007) found that Islamic banks
were faced with similar credit risks and oper-
ating risks as the other banks, and Ray and
Cashman (1999) showed that operational
risks would influence decision making in dif-
ferent ways. Marliana et al. (2011) showed
operational risks in Islamic banks were sig-
nificant and became more complicated com-
pared to conventional banking because of the
unique contractual features and general legal
environment. The next set of studies analyzed
the correlation risks and efficiency. Ariffin et
al. (2009) surveyed 28 islamic banks in 14
countries by asking the risk management
teams of these banks about the risks that
islamic banks faced compared to banks in the
traditional banking system. Ariffin et al.
showed that islamic banks faced the same
risks as western banks but used less techni-
cally advanced risk measurement techniques
than their western counterparts.
According to Srair i (2009), islamic
banks usually took on more risk than west-
ern banks due to a lack of experience and
unfamiliarity with all the financial tools that
could assist them. As a result, islamic banks
required more capital to manage this level of
risk. Giannini (2013) in her research, named
the factors that influenced mudharabah financ-
ing in Indonesian Islamic banks, and also
showed that the independent variables
namely FDR, NPF, ROA, CAR, as well as
the level of profit sharing, as a whole, had a
systematic influence on mudharabah financ-
ing. Prastanto (2013) in his research named
the factors that influenced murabahah financ-
ing by Indonesian islamic banks, and showed
that the variables FDR, NPF, DER, QR and
ROE significantly influenced the murabahah
financing.
Methods
Research Design
In this section, we describe the fixed-
effects panel model and the model selection
process with EViews used throughout this
study. A quantitative correlational research
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design was chosen for the paper. In a correla-
tional research design, the researchers who
are involved in the correlational research do
not influence the variables; rather, they gather
the data on the existing variables and inves-
tigate the relationships between those vari-
ables (Creswell 2009). Therefore, this study
would be examining the correlations between
credit, liquidity and operational risks, and
their influences on the Indonesians Islamic
banks financing for the period from 2007 to
2013.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses of the study are as fol-
lows:
H
1a
: There is a causal relationship between the credit
risk and mudarabah based financing in the
islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
2a
: There is a causal relationship between the li-
quidity risk and mudarabah based financing
in the islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
3a
: There is a causal relationship between the op-
erational risk and mudarabah based financ-
ing in the islamic banking sector in Indone-
sia.
H
4a
: There is a causal relationship between the credit
risk and murabahah based financing in the
islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
5a
: There is a causal relationship between the li-
quidity risk and murabahah based financing
in the islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
6a
: There is a causal relationship between the op-
erational risk and murabahah based financ-
ing in the islamic banking sector in Indone-
sia.
H
7a
: There is a causal relationship between the credit
risk and musharakah based financing in the
islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
8a
: There is a causal relationship between the li-
quidity risk and musharakah based financ-
ing in the islamic banking sector in Indone-
sia.
H
9a
: There is a causal relationship between the op-
erational risk and musharakah based financ-
ing in the islamic banking sector in Indone-
sia.
H
10 a
: There is a causal relationship between the
credit risk and istisna based financing in the
islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
11a
: There is a causal relationship between the li-
quidity risk and istisna based financing in
the islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
12a
: There is a causal relationship between the op-
erational risk and istisna based financing in
the islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
13 a
: There is a causal relationship between the
credit risk and ijarah based financing in the
islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
14a
: There is a causal relationship between the li-
quidity risk and ijarah based financing in the
islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
15a
: There is a causal relationship between the op-
erational risk and ijarah based financing in
the islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
16 a
: There is a causal relationship between the
credit risk and qardh based financing in the
islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
17a
: There is a causal relationship between the li-
quidity risk and qardh based financing in the
islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
H
18a
: There is a causal relationship between the op-
erational risk and qardh based financing in
the islamic banking sector in Indonesia.
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Data
The data that were used for this study
were collected from the audited financial
statements of  Indonesia’s 11 Islamic banks
that operate in the country, those banks are:
PT Bank Syariah Muamalat Indonesia, PT
Bank Syariah Mandiri, PT Bank Syariah Mega
Indonesia, PT Bank Syariah BRI, PT Bank
Syariah Bukopin, PT Bank Panin Syariah, PT
Bank Victoria Syariah, PT BCA Syariah, PT
Bank Jabar Banten, PT Bank Syariah BNI,
and PT Maybank Indonesia Syariah. For
credit, liquidity and operational risks, we used
the ratio that the banks evaluate themselves
based on the Indonesian Central Bank regu-
lations. The risks would be measured as Table
2.
The dependent variables, which were
the 6 islamic banking products, were obtained
directly from the audited financial statements
provided by each bank.
Results and Discussion
The analyzed data were interpreted to
answer the research questions. The coefficient
of correlation could be used to find the prob-
ability that the data supported the null hy-
potheses and this information could be used
to support or reject the null hypotheses at a
level of  significance of  p 0.05 to determine
whether to reject, or fail to reject, the null
hypotheses about the efficiency and risks in
Islamic banking systems. The findings are as
follows:
There is a causal relationship between: credit
risk and mudarabah based financing; op-
erational risk and mudarabah based financ-
ing; operational risk and murabahah based
financing; and liquidity risk and istishna
based financing.
There is no causal relationship between:
credit risk and musharaka based financing;
credit risk and murabahah based financing;
credit risk and ijarah based financing; credit
risk and istishna based financing; credit risk
and qardh based financing; operational risk and
musharaka based financing; operational risk
and istishna based financing; operational risk
and ijarah based financing; operational risk
and qardh based financing; liquidity risk and
musharaka based financing; liquidity risk and
mudarabah based financing; liquidity risk and
murabahah based financing; liquidity risk and
ijarah based financing; and liquidity risk and
qardh based financing.
Conclusion
The “risk sharing principle” stipulates
that in some financing products, the islamic
banks bear all the risks and therefore the con-
tract between the bank and the client, regard-
ing the share of the benefice, is made al-ghorm
bil ghonm (the higher the risk, the higher the
return). Our findings support the fact that
there is no causal relationship between the
credit risk and the typical risk sharing prod-
Variable Representation 
Credit 
 
NPF (Nonperforming 
Finance) 
Liquidity 
 
FDR (Financing to 
Deposit Ratio) 
Operational 
 
BOPO (Operational 
Expense to Operational 
Revenue) 
 
Table 2. Risks
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uct which is the musharaka financing mode,
where the bank shares the risk with the cli-
ent.
The research showed that there was no
causal effect between the credit risk and
musharakah based financing, but there was
indeed a causal effect between the credit risk
and Mudharabah based financing. As these
two modes of financing are the so called
“profit and loss sharing mode.” Musharakah
is the one that, in terms of  risk, involves the
financial institution (shahibul maal, here the
Indonesian islamic banks) and the client
(mudharib), we found out that no causal rela-
tionship was present here. But, on the other
hand, in a mudharabah based financing sys-
tem, where the financial institution bared all
the risk by giving the project the necessary
capital. The research found out that there was
a causal relationship between the islamic
based financing and the credit risk. These
findings therefore, support the scholars who
stipulated that Islamic banking was profit and
loss sharing based financing.
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
          
C 29.15687 0.543405 53.65586 0.0000 
NPF? -0.128009 0.049048 -2.609843 0.0135 
FDR? -0.002422 0.002383 -1.016520 0.3168 
BOPO? -0.026800 0.005985 -4.477908 0.0001 
          
Weighted Statistics 
     R-squared 0.924687     Mean dependent var 61.66870 
Adjusted R-squared 0.897300     S.D. dependent var 66.51449 
S.E. of regression 0.959256     Sum squared resid 30.36570 
F-statistic 33.76409     Durbin-Watson stat 1.469847 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
      
APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Mudarabah Estimation Model Result
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C 26.86434 1.133613 23.69797 0.0000 
NPF? 0.210539 0.112129 1.877657 0.0690 
FDR? 0.000234 0.006055 0.038702 0.9694 
BOPO? -0.002978 0.009510 -0.313205 0.7560 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.842311     Mean dependent var 34.47431 
Adjusted R-squared 0.786655     S.D. dependent var 16.52842 
S.E. of regression 0.729260     Sum squared resid 18.08187 
F-statistic 15.13448     Durbin-Watson stat 0.994889 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
 
Appendix 2. Musharakah Estimation Model Result
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C 30.70116 0.424798 72.27232 0.0000 
NPF? 0.137795 0.080777 1.705870 0.0964 
FDR? -0.003490 0.001845 -1.891724 0.0664 
BOPO? -0.026134 0.002944 -8.876128 0.0000 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     R-squared 0.879396     Mean dependent var 37.48851 
Adjusted R-squared 0.837022     S.D. dependent var 16.63726 
S.E. of regression 0.656889     Sum squared resid 15.96563 
F-statistic 20.75308     Durbin-Watson stat 1.338609 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
Appendix 3. Murabahah Estimation Model Result
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C 21.98815 2.033009 10.81557 0.0000 
NPF? -0.030544 0.108771 -0.280807 0.7817 
FDR? -0.007668 0.002690 -2.850212 0.0099 
BOPO? 0.035467 0.021276 1.666973 0.1111 
      Weighted Statistics   
     R-squared 0.837579     Mean dependent var 28.03265 
Adjusted R-squared 0.772610     S.D. dependent var 7.764619 
S.E. of regression 0.593217     Sum squared resid 7.038132 
F-statistic 12.89206     Durbin-Watson stat 1.609227 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
 
Appendix 4. Istishna Estimation Model Result
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C 24.20054 3.909154 6.190734 0.0000 
NPF? 0.610310 0.316496 1.928335 0.0662 
FDR? 0.002699 0.006915 0.390280 0.6999 
BOPO? -0.013767 0.046095 -0.298665 0.7679 
     
Weighted Statistics 
          
R-squared 0.880023     Mean dependent var 24.31133 
Adjusted R-squared 0.822643     S.D. dependent var 3.430241 
S.E. of regression 1.444603     Akaike info criterion 3.839406 
Sum squared resid 47.99818     Schwarz criterion 4.372669 
Log likelihood -55.18961     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.023488 
F-statistic 15.33673     Durbin-Watson stat 1.562679 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
     
Appendix 5. Ijarah Estimation Model Result
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C 23.00143 2.331780 9.864326 0.0000 
NPF? -0.018763 0.163769 -0.114569 0.9096 
FDR? 0.001020 0.010323 0.098805 0.9220 
BOPO? 0.023922 0.024999 0.956925 0.3465 
      Weighted Statistics   
     R-squared 0.956617     Mean dependent var 36.88316 
Adjusted R-squared 0.941657     S.D. dependent var 16.29050 
S.E. of regression 1.549117     Sum squared resid 69.59315 
F-statistic 63.94581     Durbin-Watson stat 1.206690 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
      
Appendix 6. Qardh Estimation Model Result
